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1. GAARs – an emerging trend in the tax landscape and in the political debate of 
many countries. 
 
Not perhaps when compared with other European countries, but statutory GAARs count 
on a relevant tradition in Spain. Disregarding some distant and rather primitive records, 
it was the Ley General Tributaria1 from 1963 (GTC 1963, hereinafter) the first statute 
to introduce, in its article 24.22, a GAAR in Spain. Clearing up the reasons for the 
introduction of this provision might prove a dificult task, especialy if one takes into 
account that it is only since 1978 that Spain has a genuine system of direct taxes. It is 
not self-evident or even explicitly declared in oficial documents, but the influence of 
compared legislation – distinctly the German Reichsabgabenordnung- might have been 
crucial for the inclusion of the GAAR3. 
 
In what everyone seems to agree is in the fact that the GAAR contained in the GTC 
1963 was hardly applied in its forty years of existence. Even after a deep reform of the 
provision in 1995 – aimed at curbing the inclination of the Spanish Tax Authorities to 
face tax avoidance by means of a classical economic interpretation4- the application of 
the GAAR remained a rara avis in the Spanish practice. Nevertheless the causes for this 
lack of practical application remain contended in the academic debate. Whilst some 
scholars considered the subjective construction of the GAAR 1963 – the requirement of 
a proven aim of avoiding tax liabilities- as the main cause of its failure, others, whose 
arguments seem more persuasive, put the blame on the existence of easier ways to fight 
tax avoidance5 in the Spanish legal order. Whatever the reasons were, the truth is that 
the deep reform of the Spanish GAAR was in the political agenda when a new Ley 
General Tributaria was enacted in 2003 (GTC 2003 hereinafter)6. Article 15 of the 
GTC 2003 -labeling it with the legaly inexpressive term “Conflict in the application of 
tax rules”- codifies the GAAR curently in force in Spain. The provision reads as 
folows: 
1 General Tax Code. 
2 According to that provision: “In order to avoid fraus legis, in relation to article 24.1 (that prohibited 
analogy in tax maters), the taxation of facts performed with the proven aim of avoiding tax liabilities if 
they generate equivalent efects to the taxable event wil not be considered an analogic extension of the 
taxable event”.  
3 Palao Taboada, C., “El fraude a la ley en Derecho tributario”, 63 Revista de Derecho Financiero y 
Hacienda Pública (1966), p. 688. 
4 Labeled graphicaly by Spanish scholars as a fraus of the fraus legis (Palao Taboada, C., “¿Existe el 
fraude a la ley tributaria?, 182 Estudios Financieros. Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación (1998), p. 7). 
5 These alternative ways, that wil be explained in detail in paragraph 8 of this report, and were initialy 
identified with the so-caled economic qualification (a strange version of the classical economic 
interpretation) did not only report material advantages –it was not necessary to consider the difficult 
undetermined concepts upon which the GAAR 1963 was built- but also alowed tax authorities to ignore 
the special (and complicated) proceeding required by the GTC 1963 to apply the General Ant-Avoidance 
Rule. 
6 In fact, the statement of intents of the GTC 2003 refers the deep reform operated in the Spanish GAAR 
mentioning the traditional problems to apply the GAAR 1963. 
 
1. A conflict in the application of tax rules wil arise when the taxpayer succeeds in 
total or partialy avoiding the taxable event, or obtains a tax base or tax due reduction 
through acts or arrangements in which both the folowing circumstances occur: (a) 
Individualy considered or, as a group, such acts are clearly artificial or improper for 
ataining the pursued objective; (b) That no other legal or economic relevant 
consequences, on the fringes of the tax saving- arise from the adoption of this legal 
form or arrangement as would have arisen had the normal, proper form be used.7 
 
2. For the Tax Administration to declare a conflict in the application of tax rules a 
special report of the Advisory Commission regulated in article 159 of the GTC wil be 
required. 
 
3. In the tax assessments issued as a result of this provision the tax wil be determined 
according to the rule that would have been fiting for the usual or proper acts or 
arrangements or eliminating the obtained tax benefits; late payments interest wil be 
also issued but never tax penalties. 
 
Even if some scholars have indicated that nothing has actualy changed in the GTC 
2003 in relation to the Spanish GAAR8 –a position that we do not share- it must be 
recognized that certain traditional defects have been maintained9, although the limited 
use of the GAAR 2003 in these last ten years is perhaps owing to diferent reasons that 
wil be considered in further paragraphs of this report. 
 
The chronology of the introduction and folowing reform of the Spanish GAAR(s) 
makes it evident that the BEPS Report(s) did not have any influence neither in its 
introduction nor in its 2003 reform. Nevertheless it would not be accurate to deny BEPS 
Report(s) a significant influence in the application and the future drafting of the Spanish 
GAAR. 
 
Like the vast majority of the OECD technical products – and in general al soft law 
devices- BEPS Report(s) are somehow “in the air”. Of course soft law generates soft 
consequences that are per se dificult to identify and describe. Nevertheless typical 
expression of the BEPS approach seem to be more and more frequent in the Spanish 
legal literature and have been recently incorporated to internal legal documents 
managed by the Spanish Tax Authorities. In fact the 2013 National Tax and Customs 
Control Plan incorporated a priority action against aggressive tax planning used by 
“…resident corporations, specialy MNEs, with the aim of artificialy reduce tax bases 
generated in Spain”. In the Plan there is also a very general reference to the BEPS 
Project without further details. To what extent this momentum efectively instils the 
behavior of the Spanish Tax Authorities and Courts, especialy when it comes to the 
application of the GAAR, is as uncertain and imprecise as the very statements contained 
in the Plan. What is more than evident is the fact that the whole BEPS Project embodies 
7 The translation of this paragraph is taken (with some nuances) from: Ruiz Almendral, V. “Tax 
Avoidance and the European Court of Justice: What is at Stake for European General Anti-Avoidance 
Rules?” 33 Intertax (2005) 12, p. 560. 
8 Palao Taboada, C. “La norma anti-elusión del proyecto de nueva Ley General Tributaria” in La 
aplicación de las normas tributarias y la elusión fiscal (Valadolid: Lex Nova, 2009), p. 167. 
9 We refer to the special proceeding now contained in articles 15.3 and 159 of the GTC 2003 that wil be 
analyzed in paragraph 2 of this report. This has been even criticized by the Courts like in the recent 
Decision of the Audiencia Nacional of February 7th 2013. 
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de facto a  new  weapon in the  hands  of the  Spanish  Tax  Authorities whose  primary 
efect would be an increasing flexibility in the consideration of the legal requirements 
upon which the application of the Spanish GAAR is based or, even, a disregard of the 
very  GAAR  provision in favor  of easier and  quicker instruments in the fight against 
double  non-taxation. In  our  opinion this  phenomenon appears clearly in the  new 
approach of the Spanish Tax Authorities and Courts to hybrid mismatch arangements10.   
 
 
2. Requirements for the application of GAARs. 
 
When  dealing  with the requirements  on  which the application  of the  Spanish  GAAR 
depends, several questions wil be considered separately for the sake of clarity. 
 
2.1  The scope  of the  Spanish  GAAR.  According to its leter  – article  15  of the  GTC 
2003 refers generaly to tax payers, taxable events, tax bases and tax due reductions- the 
Spanish  GAAR is applicable to al areas  of tax law (direct and indirect taxation,  pure 
domestic and cross-border situations) irespective  of its  national, regional  or local 
scope11. Being its scope clear on the face, some details remain uncertain in relation to 
this issue. 
 
Regarding the scope of the GAAR (either GAAR 1963 or 2003) there is phenomenon 
that has been hardly ever mentioned by scholars and represents, in our opinion, a deep 
and  worying silent reform  of the  Spanish anti-avoidance rules system.  As a  direct 
consequence of the implementation of the Mergers Directive in Spain, the existence of 
valid commercial reasons (motivos económicos válidos)  was introduced as a  pre-
requisite for the application of the deferal regime in the Spanish Corporate Income Tax 
Act (CITA hereinafter). Leaving its imperfect and staggered implementation apart12, the 
truth is that  over the last ten  years the so-caled valid commercial reason clause has 
expanded in the  Spanish  direct tax legislation (especialy in the  CITA)13.  But the 
uncontroled  growth  of the valid commercial reason in  Spanish  Tax  Law, as anti-
voidance device, has come from the hand of the administrative practice and the tolerant 
atitude  of the  Courts.  At the  beginning  of the  past  decade some authors started to 
criticize the indiscriminate use of the valid commercial reason approach for Corporate 
10 This approach wil be further described in paragraph 2 of this Report. 
11 This idea is reinforced by the fact that the GTC, according to its article 1, is applicable to al Spanish 
Tax  Administrations and therefore to al  Spanish  Taxes. Nevertheless and even if this could  have 
generated discussions, the very GTC 2003 excludes its application (and therefore the application of the 
GAAR) to levies and contributions related to the Spanish Public Social Security System. 
12 Palao  Taboada,  C. “Los  <<Motivos  Económicos  Válidos  >> en el régimen fiscal  de las 
reorganizaciones empresariales”,  235, Estudios  Financieros.  Revista  de  Contabilidad y  Tributación 
(2002), p. 63-110. 
13 The existence  of valid commercial reasons might result in:   Non application  of a  Spanish residence 
presumption for companies resident in a EU Tax Haven owing significant assets in the Spanish territory 
(art.  8.c.3  of the  CITA);  non-application  of the interest  deduction  barrier for the acquisition  of 
subsidiaries (art.  14.1 h  CITA);  Non-application  of the transfer  pricing  documentation duties for  SME 
resident in EU Tax Havens (Art. 16.2.2 CITA); application of the participation exemption for dividends 
distributed  or capital  gains  when the  non-resident company  performs the same economic activity as a 
lquidated company  previously integrated in the  group that  performed that activity  previously in  Spain 
(art.  21.3.b  CITA), application  of the  patent  box regime  when the licencee is a resident in a  EU  Tax 
Haven (art 23.1.c CITA); non-application of the special tax deferral regime for mergers and restructurings 
(art.  96.2  CITA),  non-application  of  CFC rules for subsidiaries that are resident in  EU  Member  States 
(art. 107.15 CITA).  
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Tax  purposes (normaly to  deny tax  benefits for reinvestment14),  obviously at the 
expense of the GAAR; it might wel be stated that in 2014 the valid commercial reason 
doctrine has become the anti-avoidance mantra of Spanish Tax Authorities and Courts. 
If the  GAAR and this judicial  developed  doctrine  had the same requirements and 
effects, the phenomenon would be harmless. But they do not and this double standard 
seems to  be  beyond any logic  generating, in  our  opinion, serious constitutional and 
European legal concerns15. 
 
2.2. The legal requirements of the GAAR. The position of the Spanish legal literature 
on the requirements for the application  of the  GAAR swings  back and forth  between 
two extremes. On the one side, what could be labeled as “intuitive” or “extra positive” 
approach to tax avoidance, that merely focuses on “non-acceptable16 tax savings” and as 
a result the specific legal  drafting  of the  GAAR seems irelevant  being simply 
disregarded17.  The  other extreme suggests a strict literalistic approach to the  GAAR 
atributing a crucial importance to every  word  or expression contained in it  deriving 
normaly in a  very restrictive scope  of the rule18.  As  usual, this  debate  has  not 
influenced the  Spanish  practice  but if  one should  describe the  position  of the  Spanish 
Tax Authorities and Courts it would be closer to an intuitive approach19. The fact that 
this approach, as  wil  be shown in further  paragraphs, severely  undermines legal 
certainty  does  not  mean that  we adopt the  previously  described literalistic approach20. 
To this respect this report should be considered as the search of a “happy medium”. 
 
a)  The existence  of a tax saving. It is  quite  obvious that the existence  of a tax saving 
must  be a  prerequisite for the application  of  whatever anti-avoidance  device.  The 
Spanish  GAAR is  not an exception as far as it requires the avoidance of the taxable 
event,  or the  obtaining  of  a tax  base  or tax  due reduction. The fact that the elected 
formulation  merits criticism21 does  not contradict the existence  of this  quasi-universal 
element  of any  GAAR.  Nevertheless the existence  of a tax saving,  being an 
indispensable element  of the  GAAR,  might  not  by itself trigger the application  of the 
anti-avoidance rule.  Resorting to the example  of  double  non-taxation  generated  by 
14 Normaly questioning the assets in which the benefits had been reinvested (i.e. financial instruments): 
Durán-Sindreu  Buxadé,  A. Los  Motivos  Económicos  Válidos como  Técnica contra la  Elusión  Fiscal: 
Economía de Opción, Autonomía de Voluntad y Causa en los Negocios (Pamplona:  Aranzadi,  2007),  p. 
121-127. 
15 Especialy if  one takes into account that cross-border transactions either  performed  by resident 
companies abroad or non-resident companies in Spain seem to be the preferent target of this approach. 
16 Off course there are more and less sophisticated approaches in relation to this position that normaly 
depend on the grounds according to which a tax saving must not be accepted. 
17 This approach has been frequently criticized by tax lawyers in Spain: Marín Benítez, G. ¿Es lícita la 
planificación fiscal?  Sobre los  defectos  de  neutralidad y consistencia  del  ordenamiento tributario, 
(Pamplona-Valadolid: Thomson Reuters Lex Nova, 2013), p. 329.  
18 In our opinion the most evident example of this approach is contained in: García Novoa, C. La cláusula 
antielusiva, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004), 452 p.  
19 The Decision of the Spanish Supreme Court of May 11th 2004 (Austrian bonds) has been considered as 
the starting point of this exchangeable approach to different anti-avoidance measures.  
20 In this paragraph we wil try to describe the excess into which the formalistic approach has falen.  
21 The formulation  of article  15  GTC  2003 is at the same time complex and incomplete. It  does  not 
describe the two  main strategies  by  means  of  which abuse is  performed in  Tax  Law (abuse through 
avoidance and abuse through capture, see  Zornoza, J.J. and  Báez,  A. “The  2003  Revisions to the 
Commentary to the  OECD  Model  on  Tax  Treaties and  GAARs:  A  Mistaken  Starting  Point”, in Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (Amsterdam: IBFD,  2010),  p.  133).   Moreover 
its reference to the avoidance of the taxable event gives rise to some formalistic interpretations according 
to which the GAAR could not be applied to certain withholding liabilities. 
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hybrid  mismatch arangements, if  domestic law  provisions  prevent exemption for 
payments that are deductible by the payer in its residence state it is evident that we face 
a tax saving but, of course, further elements must meet in order to apply the GAAR22. 
 
This also seems to be the position of the Spanish Tax Authorities and Courts as far as 
the GAAR has not been used to corect situations of double non-taxation generated by 
several  hybrid financial instruments23.  But this  does  not  mean that the  Spanish  Tax 
Authorities have assumed – according to BEPS Action 2- that the corect approach for 
the  neutralization  of the efects  of  hybrid  mismatch arangements lies in  new  model 
treaty  provisions  or  new  domestic rules that  wil solve the  problem pro futuro. The 
“solution”  has  been  more twisted and cynical.  Being aware  of the fact that certain 
hybrids (Brazilian juros sobre capital próprio or australian preferent shares) wil never 
meet the requisites of artificiality laid down in the regulation of the GAAR, the Spanish 
Tax Administration decided to chalenge the application of the Participation Exemption 
(art.  21  CITA)  qualifying the  generated income as interests24.  These administrative 
decisions,  whose recognition  by the  Courts  has  not  been consistent25, show that the 
mere tax saving does not involve immediately the application of the GAAR and, for the 
same reasons, that certain tax arbitrages match hardly in the traditional logic of GAARs. 
Unfortunately it also shows that sometimes the Tax Administration is not wiling to lose 
the batle even if the victory requires an unnatural use of interpretation techniques26. 
 
b) A tax saving obtained through artificial or improper arangements. The line between 
tax savings  obtained as a result  of legitimate tax  planning and those that  merit 
corection by means of the GAAR, is built in article 15 of the GTC 2003 based on two 
cumulative requirements: the arangement(s)  must  be artificial  or improper for 
ataining the  pursued  objective (artificiality test) and  no  other legal  or economic 
relevant consequences, on the fringes of the tax saving, arise from its adoption (efects 
test). 
22 This must be our opinion in al “double non-taxation” cases unless we decide to definitely blur the line 
between tax planning and tax abuse in international tax law.  
23 In fact the non-application of the Spanish GAAR as an immediate reaction to international double non 
taxation cases had been previously suggested by the Spanish Supreme Court in the Austrian Bonds saga. 
Interests generated  by  bonds issued  by the  Austrian  Government  were exempt in  Spain according to 
article  11  of the  Spain-Austria  DTC and also exempt in  Austria according to  Austrian  domestic  Law. 
Even if this  generated a  huge  problem in  Spain,  due to some  deficiencies  of the  Spanish  domestic 
regulation of capital gains and losses, the Supreme Court was categorical by stating (Decision may 11th 
2004): “The lawfulnes  of tax  planning strategies that  do  not  afect the  ability to  pay  principle  or in 
general the tax justice is beyond any doubt. It would be diferent if an abnormal business would appear in 
the guise of a legitimate tax planning; but this is obviously not the case when the tax payer in Austrian 
bonds obtains the exemption of the interests according to the DTC and any other applicable tax benefits”. 
For the sake of clarity it must be remembered that the taxpayer lost the case at the end but due to reasons 
totaly alien to the problem of double non-taxation. 
24 The reasoning folowed  by the  Spanish  Tax  Administration (Decisions  of the Tribunal  Económico 
Administrativo Central, TEAC hereinafter of April 13th 2011 and April 26th 2012) are certainly not easy 
to  be  understood from a legal  perspective  but the fact that  the  payments  have  been  deductible  by the 
payer seems to have been crucial for the decisions. Needless to say that the decisions have been merciless 
criticized  by  Spanish scholars:  Martín Jiménez,  A; Calderón  Carrero, J.M. “  El  Plan  de  Acción  de la 
OCDE  para eliminar la erosión  de  bases imponibles  y el traslado  de  beneficios a  otras jurisdicciones 
(“BEPS”): ¿el final, el principio del final o el final del principio?”, 1 Quincena Fiscal (2014).  
25 In the case of Australian Preferent Shares the Decision of the Audiencia Nacional April 18th 2013 has 
confirmed the position of the Tax Administration. Nevertheless the Decision of the Audiencia Nacional 
February  27th  2014 annuled the assessment  of the  Tax  Administration in the case  of the Juros sobre 
Capital Próprio and applied the Spanish Participation Exemption. 
26 This problem wil be further considered in paragraph 8 of this Report. 
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First and foremost it must be stated that the Spanish legislator added in the same rule 
two conceptual elements (tests) rooted in two  diferent legal traditions27, that  perhaps 
were not that diferent in practice. The idea is quite simple: if an arangement turns out 
to be artificial it is dificult other legal or economic consequences to arise; if no other 
legal  or economic consequences arise from its adoption it is  normaly  because the 
arangement is artificial28.  As a result, and for the sake  of simplicity, this report  wil 
focus on artificiality as the key issue of the Spanish GAAR. Article 15 of the GTC 2003 
requires for the application  of the  GAAR the scrutinized arangements to  be 
individualy considered or, as a group, clearly artificial or improper for ataining the 
pursued objective. Several consequences arise from this legal formulation: 
 
1)  The infrequency  or  non-usual character  of an arangement is excluded for the 
construction of the concept of artificiality. Even if the term “usual” was rescued when 
drafting the efects test in article 15.1.b) GTC 2003 and the consequences of applying 
the GAAR in article 15.3 GTC 2003, it is uppermost that this very term disappeared of 
the first draft version of article 15 GTC 2003. The initial project refered to unusual or 
improper arangements and, due perhaps to heavy criticism in the Spanish literature29, 
was finaly replaced  by the expression  now in force.  Therefore, according to article 
15.1.a  GTC  2003 and the  very logic  –  using frequency as a test  would  pose and 
important  obstacle for contractual freedom and innovation30-  how  often a certain (tax 
planning) arangement is used in the practice is totaly irelevant for the application of 
the  GAAR.  Nevertheless since  2005 the  Spanish Audiencia  Nacional refers to the 
unusual  or  unheard character  of an arangement as a sign for the application  of the 
GAAR31 in its  both  versions  of  1963 and  2003.  Even if these terms  have  become 
omnipresent in recent case law  – e.g. the debt push down saga that  wil  be  described 
later- its importance should not be overvalued as far as the mere repetition of previous 
decisions is frequent in the  Spanish case law  without implying the creation  of a solid 
line of reasoning; moreover it was just used by the case law as an additional element to 
strengthen the arguments for the application of the GAAR. 
 
2) The meaning of clearly artificial or improper. The fact that the Spanish legislator has 
used two diferent adjectives to characterize abusive arangements has generated a great 
amount  of academic interest; and just academic as far as these  discussions  have  not 
emerged in the  practice  of the  Tax  Administration  or the  Courts. Weather  or  not 
artificial and improper are to be atributed diferent legal meanings wil, in our opinion, 
remain  unresolved.   The truth is that the  GAAR  2003 seems to  have resorted to the 
traditional legal  German concept  of inadequacy (Unangemessenheit) that  wil arise 
either in the form  of a  discrepancy  between the typical cause  of an arangement 
27 The eclecticism of the Spanish GAAR 2003 –(ingrained at the same time in the German Missbrauch 
von Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten des Rechts and the  Anglo-Saxon business purpose test)  has  been already 
described  by  Spanish scholars:   Palao  Taboada,  C. “La  norma anti-elusión  del  proyecto  de  nueva  Ley 
General Tributaria” in La aplicación de las normas tributarias y la elusión fiscal (Valadolid: Lex Nova, 
2009), p. 168.  
28 This redundancy  was  very soon revealed  by  Spanish  practitioners:  López  Telo, J. “La cláusula 
antiabuso del Anteproyecto de Nueva Ley General Tributaria”, 5 Actualidad Jurídica Uría & Menéndez 
(2003), p. 51. 
29 López Telo, 5 Actualidad Jurídica Uría & Menéndez (2003), p. 49-50. 
30 López Telo, 5 Actualidad Jurídica Uría & Menéndez (2003), p. 50. 
31 This expression has been used at least 48 times in the case Law of the Audiencia Nacional according to 
the official records of the Spanish Courts. 
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(according to private law) and the objective for which tax payers use that arangement 
or in the form of a group of arangements considered improper for ataining the pursued 
objective. The first acceptation of the very meaning of artificiality is wel known in our 
legal tradition,  having  Spain a causal contractual system32, and  has  been traditionaly 
used to face simple isolated arangements used by the tax payer to obtain tax savings33. 
In these cases, an arangement  wil  be labeled as artificial if  used for an  objective 
diferent from its typical cause according to Private Law. Things become more dificult 
when it comes to determine weather a set of transactions might be considered artificial 
or improper.  The step transactions doctrine, that  Spanish scholars consider embedded 
in article  15.1.a)  GTC  2003,  has  not  been seriously analyzed  by the  Courts  yet,  but 
several decisions foresee a topical or circumstantial approach. In this regard in a recent 
set  of cases, related to so-caled debt push down transactions, the  Spanish  Courts just 
refered to a  group  of circumstances that rendered the  whole set  of transactions 
artificial. 
 
The facts can be easily described. A resident subsidiary of a MNE (enjoying exemption 
for foreign  dividends34) acquires significant  participations  of  non-resident subsidiaries 
of the same  group, financing the acquisitions  by  means  of loans  granted  by  other 
subsidiary of the same group. As far as its income is tax exempt and interest paid for the 
loan is deductible, the (holding) company generates important tax losses. If additionaly 
one takes into account that since 2000 the Spanish Holdings (ETVEs) are also alowed 
to consolidate for tax  purposes  with  other subsidiaries  of the  group  one  might 
understand the important erosion  of  Spanish  Tax  Bases these transactions  have 
generated. 
 
Instead of conceptualizing artificiality for groups of transactions –like it has been made 
in  other jurisdictions35 reaching  valuable concepts as circularity  or internal 
contradictivity- the Spanish Tax Administration, and also the Courts36, have dealt with 
these groups of transactions by merely accumulating pretended circumstantial evidences 
of artificiality (the acquired participations belonged to the group before the transactions 
and after them; there  has  not  been a significant change in the  management  of the 
acquired subsidiaries; the loans have been granted by companies also integrated in the 
group). This “topical approach” severely undermines legal certainty as far as the very 
concept of artificiality remains unknown besides the fact that the specific weight of each 
circumstance is not determined. To this respect future decisions become impredectible 
as far as consequences of the lack of one of these circumstances is not known – e.g. the 
existence  of extra-group loans37- and  other circumstances, that  might  never  be 
32 As opposed to an abstract (non-causal) contractual system.  
33 A  good index  of these cases in:  Durán-Sindreu  Buxadé, Los  Motivos  Económicos  Válidos como 
Técnica contra la Elusión Fiscal: Economía de Opción, Autonomía de Voluntad y Causa en los Negocios 
(2007), p. 227-291. 
34 Due to a special holding regime or due to the application of the Spanish Participation Exemption. 
35 For Germany: Schön, W. “Legalität, Gestaltungsfreiheit und Belastungsgleichheit als Grundlagen des 
Steuerrechts” in Gestaltungsfreiheit  und  Gestaltungsmissbrauch im  Steuerrecht (Köln:  Oto  Schmidt, 
2010), p. 60-61. 
36 Several decisions of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional of February 7th 2013 (IFF Latin), November 7th 
2013 (Cimpor Inversiones S.A.),  November  14th  2013 (GE Plastics),  February  13 th  2013 (Accenture), 
December 16th 2013 (Mann Hummel) and January 16th 2014 (Hanson Pioneer). 
37 To this respect the Spanish legislator introduced in 2012 a SAAR denying deduction of interests paid 
due to intra-group loans for the acquisition  of subsidiaries that already  belonged to the  group.  The 
relevance  of this restriction to intra-group interest  of the  new  SAAR for  previous  debt-push  down 
arrangements  with external loans remains  uncertain.  Some authors, linked to the  Tax  Administration, 
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considered as a sign of artificiality, are added in order to “reinforce” the application of 
the GAAR38.  
 
3) Despite of the reported uncertainty, the new drafting of the Spanish GAAR in GTC 
2003  has reported considerable advantages  when compared  with the  GAAR  1963: a) 
The reference to artificial arangements and the lack of other legal or economic relevant 
consequences  have  definitely removed subjective elements from the conditions  upon 
which the application of the GAAR is based. Some scholars have praised this change39, 
as far as the proven aim of avoiding tax liabilities contained in the  GAAR  1963 was 
considered one of the main obstacles for its application40. b) The object and purpose of 
the circumvented  or captured law (that  happened to  be crucial  under the authority  of 
GTC 196341) is disregarded according to the GAAR 2003. As stated before, article 15 
GTC 2003 merely focuses on the artificiality of the executed arangements eliminating 
the traditional purposive approach to tax avoidance (embedded in the traditional fraus 
legis 1963). In  our  opinion this reports enormous advantages.  Sometimes the  Spanish 
Courts  have improperly exacerbated this  purposive approach to tax avoidance  by 
making a reference to the ethical content  of the circumvented  provision infringed in 
cases  of tax abuse42. It  goes  without saying that confusing the  objective  purpose  of a 
provision with a pretended “ethical content” is a clear technical mistake that might wel 
degenerate into a replacement of the law by the personal approach to ethics and justice 
of every judge.  But even if a  proper and technical concept  of  purpose  of the law is 
managed, this approach keeps on proving problematic. Any tax expert knows that many 
tax provisions lack the teleological design needed for a purposive interpretation. It is not 
just the frequent chaotic, opportunistic and contradictive design of the tax system that 
generates this phenomenon but also, and specialy, the fact that certain rules are per se 
unsuitable for a  purposive interpretation43 and, last  but  not least, that some tax rules 
have suggested that even  with exclusive extra-group financing,  debt  push  down transactions could  be 
faced  by  means  of the  GAAR (Sanz  Gadea,  E. “Dos sentencias  decisivas en  materia  de  gastos 
financieros”, in htps:/blogmastercaf.wordpress.com/2012/10/19/dos-sentencias-decisivas-en-materia-de-
gastos-financieros/ (last visit April 4th 2014). 
38 This is the case of low or no taxation of the interests received by the lender in its Residence State. The 
previous reported decisions, even recognizing that double non-taxation of the interests is not crucial for 
the application of the GAAR, consider low taxation of the interests at residence as a “plus that increases 
the efectiveness of the strategy”. And, what is even worse, in the most recent decision of the Audiencia 
Nacional of January 16th 2014 (Hanson Pioneer) non-taxation of the interests is labeled as an “essential 
piece of information for the application of the GAAR”. 
39 Simón Acosta, E, 568 Actualidad Jurídica Aranzadi (2003), p. 3. García Novoa, C., 8 Quincena Fiscal 
(2003), p. 13. 
40 Palao Taboada has suggested an objective approach to the GAAR 1963 deducted from other elements 
of its regulation  different from the  mere proven aim of avoiding tax liabilities (Palao  Taboada,  C. “La 
norma anti-elusión  del  proyecto  de  nueva  Ley  General  Tributaria” in La  aplicación  de las  normas 
tributarias y la elusión fiscal (Valadolid:  Lex  Nova,  2009),  p.  153). We totaly share this  opinion in 
theoretical terms but the truth is that in the practice the Spanish Tax Administration frequently resorted to 
internal tax planning documents elaborated by the tax payers (describing tax savings opportunities) as the 
effective proof of the aim of avoiding tax liabilities, even in the absence of further evidence. 
41 The  GAAR  1963 (at least since its reform in  1995) required that the tax saving  had  been  obtained 
sheltering in the wording of a provision enacted with a diferent purpose. 
42 This is  not exceptional.  Starting  with a  decision  of the Audiencia Nacional dated July  6th  2005 this 
reference has appeared in at least 76 decisions of this Court. 
43 We  have already  made a reference to this  phenomenon in relation to  distributive rules in  DTCs and 
cases  of so caled rule-shopping:  Zornoza  &  Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and 
Economics (2010), p. 157. 
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cannot be atributed a diferent goal than raising revenue44. If this is the case, the risk of 
Cash-Justice, according to which the corect interpretation would be that which leads to 
the higher tax colection, seems unavoidable. This risk becomes extreme when the very 
GAAR and the requirements for its application are simply replaced, in an explicit  or 
implicit  way,  by teleological considerations45. In short, if the  new  GAAR is  properly 
understood it  might report significant advantages in comparison to the teleological 
approach embedded in the fraus legis clause 196346. 
 
2.3 The burden of proof in the Spanish GAAR. Article 15 GTC 2003 does not depart 
from the general rules on burden of the proof generaly regulated for tax law purposes in 
article 105 GTC 2003 according to which a person who desires to make a right efective 
must prove the facts underlying this right. The truth is that both provisions must be read 
together resulting in the Tax Administration being alocated the burden of the proof of 
those facts upon which the artificiality test and efects test is conditioned47. 
 
 Nevertheless, and as already  mentioned,  SAARs linked to the existence  of  valid 
commercial reasons  have  proliferated, especialy in the area  of cross-border 
transactions. These rules normaly shift the burden of proof to tax payers as regards the 
existence of valid commercial reasons for the afected transactions. This shifting might 
be problematic when contrasted with European fundamental freedoms48. Nevertheless, 
the most worying phenomenon in this area is again the already described proliferation 
of the valid commercial reason as administrative and judicial anti-avoidance  doctrine 
that implies shifting the  burden  of  proof to the taxpayer  without a legal  basis (the 
general applicable rule is that contained in article 105 of the GTC in relation to article 
15). 
 
3. Legal consequences of applying the GAAR. 
 
As already mentioned in previous publications49, anti-avoidance rules are not part of the 
rules set  by  domestic tax laws for  determining  which facts  give rise to a tax liability. 
This position -implicitly suggested in the questionnaire- seems to be inspired in the so 
caled factual  approach, embedded in the  Commentaries  on article  1  of the  OECD 
44 In relation to limited exemptions in  VAT:  Báez,  A., Bad  Laws  Make  Hard  Cases:  Halifax  and the 
avoidance of inconsistent tax rules, in 
htp:/e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/18830/bad baez 2008.pdf?sequence=1 (last  visit  April 
25, 2014). 
45 This is in  our  opinion the  position  defended in  Spain  by  Ruiz  Almendral,  V. El  Fraude  a la  Ley 
Tributaria a Examen (2006).  
46 As already reported  by  practitioners:  Marín  Benítez,  G. ¿Es lícita la  planificación fiscal?  Sobre los 
defectos de neutralidad y consistencia del ordenamiento tributario, (2013), p. 331-332.  
47 Even if some scholars have defended that this might prove problematic when it comes to the abusive 
enjoyment of tax benefits. It has been stated that the special rule on the burden of the proof contained in 
the special tax  deferral rule for  mergers is in line  with the  general rule as far as the taxpayer  bears the 
burden of the proof of the cost-side of taxes (expenses and tax benefits) (Reyero, R. Et al. “Régimen de 
las reorganizaciones empresariales” in Impuesto sobre  Sociedades.  Regímenes especiales y 
especialidades territoriales. Tomo III (Pamplona:  EY  Abogados-Thomson  Reuters-Aranzadi,  2013),  p. 
939. This statement confuses the facts upon which the application of a tax benefit is based with the facts 
that underlay the artificiality and effects tests contained in article 15 of the GTC 2003. 
48 This wil be analyzed in paragraph 6 of this report. Some reflections might be found as regards Spanish 
SAARs in: Rodríguez-Bereijo León, M. “La carga de la prueba en el Derecho Tributario: su aplicación en 
las  normas tributarias anti-abuso  y en la  doctrina  del  TJUE” in  344 Estudios  Financieros. Revista  de 
Contabilidad y Tributación (2011), p. 32-46. 
49 Zornoza & Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (2010), p. 132 ff. 
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Model Tax Convention; without questioning the extraordinary technical authority of the 
Commentaries, it  must  be recognized that  GAARs are  not rules  dealing  with the real 
fact patern underlying a transaction or set of transactions but actualy legal devices that 
embody a process of legal application as the very consequence of tax avoidance. In this 
sense the question is not to determine weather or not some facts actualy occured, but if 
that factual patern was displayed so that that a rule either could not be applied (abuse 
through avoidance)  or  was applied even if  not intended for cases  of the  kind (abuse 
through capture). 
 
Descending to  Spanish  domestic law this  was clearly the solution in the  GAAR  1963 
and even after some changes,  which  have turned the rule  more ambiguous in this 
respect, in the  GTC  2003.  Leaving apart the controversy  on  weather the  GAAR  2003 
actualy contributes a new point of view, the truth is that article 15.3 GTC 2003 refers to 
the application  of the rule “…that would have been fiting for the usual or proper acts 
or arrangements”  or the elimination “…of the obtained tax benefits”.  Unlike in sham 
transactions, for which according to article 16 of the GTC 2003 the legal consequence is 
the  mere assessment  of the actualy  performed facts and the application  of the 
coresponding tax rule, the GAAR requires a strict legal reasoning in which facts are not 
discussed but just weather or not the avoided or captured provision might be applied to 
them50. Therefore just in sham cases can be properly stated that the actual fact patern 
has  been replaced  by the "appropriate"  one.  And this  kind  of "fiction"  has its efects 
"exclusively" for tax purposes, as clearly stated in art. 16.2 of the GTC. This means for 
example that if a transaction is considered as a sham for tax  purposes there  wil  be a 
mismatch  between the “tax” and the “commercial accounting” truth  of the tax  payer; 
and even if there is no case-law to this respect, these mismatches should be taken into 
account for future transactions purposes if double-taxation wants to be eliminated. This 
can be easily ilustrated resorting to the decision of the Audiencia Nacional of October 
16th  2013 refered to a Leveraged  buy-out  and  Dividend recap. transactions that the 
Court considered as a sham  hiding a  distribution  of  dividends.  The  decision 
recharacterized capital  gains as  dividends and, leaving  other  questions apart, this 
provokes that the commercial  value  of the shares  difers from its tax  value; if this 
diference is not taken into account in future transactions double taxation might arise if 
the already taxed  dividends are  not considered  when calculating the capital  gain 
originated by the sale of the shares. 
 
When it comes to the application  of the  GAAR the situation seems identical at first 
glance;  nevertheless, at least in layman´s terms, the application  of a  GAAR  generates 
efects just for a certain tax and transaction and therefore without a projection on other 
possible arangement(s) and tax(es).  Even if  not  mentioned in article  15  of the  GTC 
2003 there are clear signs of this approach in other legal provisions. When the legislator 
pretends a far-reaching fiction it is explicitly declared as is the case for example in the 
secondary adjustment  derived from transfer  pricing rules.  Article  16.8  of the  Spanish 
CITA imposes legal consequences (adjustments) for al intents and tax  purposes. If a 
similar statement is not contained in article 15 GTC 2003 it might wel be deducted a 
contrario that the legal consequences of the GAAR are pretended to be more modest. 
50 On this nature Marín Benítez, G. ¿Es lícita la planificación fiscal? Sobre los defectos de neutralidad y 
consistencia  del  ordenamiento tributario, (2013),  p.  242-256. To this respect the  decision  of the 
Audiencia Nacional February 21st 2013 when confirming the application of the old fraus legis rule to a 
debt  push  down transaction  does  not  does  not change the  qualification  of the interest as such  but just 
denies its deductibility. 
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Notwithstanding,  when it comes to a complex artificial set  of transactions avoiding 
colateral efects seems  dificult.  Let  us take the  decision  of the  Supreme  Court of 
February  21st  201351, in  which the  necessity  of additional adjustments for  other taxes 
and taxpayers seems evident in  order to avoid  not  pretended  double taxation. In the 
absence  of a specific legal regulation, the  Tax  Administration can  be required a 
coherent performance in order to avoid non-pretended double taxation generated by the 
asymmetrical valuation of the same reality.52 This might generate dificulties especialy 
if formal ownership of assets or items of income is concerned; but again coherence must 
prevail particularly as it concerns third parties to the abusive arangement53. 
 
Obviously this  generates  particular concerns in cross-border transactions in  which the 
efects generated by the application of the GAAR do not need to be accepted by third 
countries. This explains that in these cases, from which debt push down transactions are 
outstanding examples,  double economic taxation arises frequently54.  Even if  not 
accepted by the Spanish Tax Administration –as shown in the December 13th Decision 
of the Audiencia  Nacional- this  phenomenon should  be corected  by  means  of the 
mutual agreement  procedure.  What is even  worse, the  Spanish  domestic regulation  of 
the mutual agreement procedure (Royal Decree 1794/2008 of November 3rd) seems to 
protect this approach as far as the procedure might be closed in cases of tax avoidance 
inasmuch as it can  be rejected  by the tax authorities if the taxpayer “tried to  avoid 
taxation in one of the two Contracting States”. 
 
Therefore the application of the GAAR might generate significant uncertainty which by 
the  way  does  not seem to  be easily counteracted  by rulings  which  have  been rather 
frequent in the specific area of the special tax merger regime but not when it comes to 
the application  of the  GAAR55.  Even if there is  not a specific ruling regime for the 
application of the GAAR, it is also true that no legal obstacle exists in order to apply the 
general procedure on rulings according to articles 88 and 89 of the GTC56. 
51 A case in which two natural persons acquire an immovable property using a Company whose shares 
could be sold tax free; later the shares are sold to a third Company which was actualy interstesd in the 
acquisition of the immovable property from the beginning. The Court considers the whole transactions as 
abusive and applying the GAAR labels the benefit generated in the transactions as a dividend for personal 
income tax purposes of the natural persons. 
52 To make a reference to the case described before the adjustment made in relation to the natural persons 
should have affected also the tax base of the two companies taking part in the arrangements. If the benefit 
is considered a dividend for the shareholders the companies should receive a coherent treatment. This was 
requested to the  Supreme  Court that  dismissed the appeal in its  September  16th 2013  Decision just  on 
formal arguments (this was a new claim). 
53 This explains that in the February 21st Decision of the Supreme Court the GAAR does not generate a 
single consequence for the taxpayer acquiring the shares  of the  Company  which  owns the immovable 
property. 
54 As far as the interests whose deductibility is denied in Spain are paid to a non-resident taxpayer and 
consequently subject to Spanish withholding taxes as referred in the 21st February Decision 2013 of the 
Audiencia Nacional. The same should be reported in relation to the Decision of December 13th 2013 as 
far as the interests were incorporated to the Tax Base of the lender in the UK even if those were exempted 
in that country according to the so caled Group Relief. 
55 No  Rulings appear at least in the  database  of the  General  Taxes  Directorate in 
htp:/petete minhap.gob.es/Scripts/know3.exe/tributos/CONSUVIN/consulta.htm (last access 
28/04/2014).  
56 Nevertheless according to article 15.2 and 159 GTC a special Board must confirm weather or not the 
GAAR is applicable. There is  no reference to this special “intervention” in the  provisions  of the  GTC 
dedicated to rulings something that adds further uncertainty to its application.  
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4. GAARs and SAARs. 
 
Like in other systems, several SAARs have been introduced in Spain especialy during 
the last ten years. Even if SAARs can be found al along the Spanish Tax System, the 
fact is that they have proliferated in the area of cross-border income taxation either in 
outbound or inbound situations. Spain counts on typical and internationaly standardised 
SAARs such as  CFC rules, thin cap rules57 and transfer  pricing rules, also  on treaty 
SAARS and finaly  on special anti-abuse  provisions implemented according to tax 
directives.  A long list  of  own inventing  SAARs even if  projected  on cross  border 
transactions and  built  upon International/European standards  have  been introduced in 
recent times.  There is  no recognizable  policy approach  on this issue and there is  not 
even a clear case law  on the relationship  between  GAAR and  SAARs.  Therefore the 
folowing reflections are based upon discussions at an academic level and vested with 
certain il founded administrative and court decisions.  
 
In order to give an answer to the relation between GAAR and SAARs when it comes to 
the application of the law, SAARs cannot be considered as a unique concept; they must 
be rather categorized in “proper  SAARs” and “improper (general/sectorial)  SAARs. 
“Improper  or sectorial  SAARs”  might  be labeled those rules that refered to special 
transactions in particular taxes – as proper SAARs do- folow nevertheless the typical 
conceptual approach of GAARs rejecting the transaction for tax purposes according to 
general concepts such as artificiality  or  business  purpose test.  The  paradigmatic 
example  would  be the valid commercial reason requirement for the application  of the 
Merger Tax Deferal regime (contained in article 96.2 of the CITA)58. Proper SAARs 
define the transactions that merit a tax corection without resorting to general concepts 
and defining in a closed way –normaly refered to time or quantitative limits- what is 
considered abusive in advance.  According to this classification, the relation  between 
those kinds of rules seems easy at first glance. 
 
If  on the face  both rules are applicable  –the specific requirements contained in the 
SAAR and in, a first approach, the general concepts upon which the GAAR is based- 
we are facing a typical lex specialis derogat generali situation and the SAAR should be 
applied. The only problem in this evident solution is that sectorial SAARs are in many 
cases designed with diferent consequences of those that would arise in case of applying 
the GAAR (procedural requirements, administrative fines or tax crimes, rules on burden 
of the  proof) even if its requirements for application are identical  or  very similar to 
those  of the  GAAR. In short:  does it  make any sense that the application  of the  valid 
commercial reason SAAR for mergers does not require a special procedure, might result 
in tax penalties or crimes or shifts the burden of the proof to the tax payer (al diferent 
requirements and consequences to that  previously  described in relation to the  GAAR) 
even if the event(s) that trigger(s) its application is(are)  not  diferent from those 
contained in article  15  GTC  2003?  The  proliferation  of sectorial  GAARS, especialy 
dealing  with cross-border transactions,  has  generated  great concern in the  Spanish 
57 Thin cap rules were abrrogated in 2012 and a new interest deduction barrier was introduced. 
58 As already stated this sectorial  SAAR  has  been introduced in  many  CITA rules in  Spain and even 
applied as a judicial GAAR without legal basis by Spanish Courts. 
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literature59 and with good reason, if one takes into account this disparity might generate 
discrimination problems at a Domestic, European and International level. 
 
Nevertheless  bigger legal  problems arise in those cases in  which  SAARs are  not 
applicable as far as the Tax Administration might be tempted to apply the GAAR. Of 
course this wil just happen in those cases in which the SAAR would be applicable at 
first sight but the facts are out of its scope due to diferent circumstances: the tax payer 
makes  use  of the safe-harbor contained in the  SAAR, the tax  payer abuses the  very 
SAAR either for its application  or  non-application  or the  SAAR is  not applicable for 
certain tax  payers  or transactions, i.e. EU  Law constraints60. In these cases it seems 
evident that the lex specialis principle does not come into play as far as we do not face a 
situation in which two rules are applicable to the same facts, but rather one (the GAAR). 
Nevertheless, deducting from the mere non-application of the SAAR the applicability of 
the GAAR would be, in our opinion, less than persuasive. This would mean a limited 
approach to the two-faced reality of SAARs as far as this kind of rules describe what is 
abusive according to the legislator  but, at the same time, clarify a contrario what 
arangements  might  not  be considered abusive.  Applying the  GAAR in this context 
would  be  hardly reconcilable  with the  principle  of legal certainty and a bona fide 
application of tax law provisions. Being more precise, one could think that the GAAR is 
applicable but just to conclude that, when the tax payers is within the legal limits of the 
SAAR, the arangement can  never  be considered artificial.  With a substantial lack  of 
legal reasoning this seems to  be the approach  of the  Spanish  Tax  Administration and 
Courts in certain realy old decisions61. This is also the unanimous position of Spanish 
scholars even if sometimes grounded mistakenly on the lex specialis principle62.    
 
The solution turns  out to  be  more complicated in certain cases in  which the  non-
applicability of a SAAR is not originated by a use of the taxpayer of the “safe harbors” 
contained in the  very  SAAR.  Perhaps the typology  might  be  broader,  but  we  have 
identified at least two groups of cases in relation to this issue: the tax payer artificialy 
avoids the application of a SAAR or provokes its application63 (abuse of SAARs); and 
second a  SAAR is  not applicable  due to an eventual infringement  of fundamental 
freedoms  when afecting cross-border (European) transactions.  These  problems  have 
arisen in  Spain  when applying the Old  Spanish  Thin-capitalization rule  built  upon a 
fixed 3:1 ratio. 
 
59 Soler  Roch,  M.T. “Las  normas antiabuso  generales  y especiales” in VII Jornada  Metodológica  de 
Derecho Financiero y Tributario Jaime García Añoveros (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2011), 
p. 189. 
60 When the abusive behavior is radicaly different from that enshrined in the SAAR, the problem does 
not arise. It does not arise either when a sectorial or improper SAAR is not applicable as far as being its 
structure identical to that contained in the  GAAR the  non-application  of the former  would  make the 
application of the later logicaly impossible. 
61 The decision of the TEAC of April 26th 1989 in relation to a Spanish SAAR referred to the transfer of 
immovable property for indirect tax purposes is frequently quoted as the leading case on this problem. 
62 For a realy complete reference to the Spanish academic approach to this issue: Marín Benítez, G. ¿Es 
lícita la  planificación fiscal? Sobre los  defectos  de  neutralidad y consistencia  del  ordenamiento 
tributario, (2013), p. 283. 
63 This strange case  was rather common in  Spain in relation to the  domestic controled corporations 
regime (anti-deferral rules) applicable in Spain until 2003. These rules were designed in a manner that 
sometimes opened interesting tax planning opportunities. The case was not conceptualy different of the 
problem that wil be analyzed in the text in relation to thin-cap rules. 
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In relation to the first issue, a  Spanish  Company received loans  of associated  US 
resident companies that could  have triggered the application  of the  Spanish thin-
capitalization rules.  Nevertheless the loans  were issued to a  Company resident in 
Luxemburg that  on its turn issued loans to the final  Spanish  borower.  As far as the 
Spanish  Thin-Cap rules  were  not applicable  when the lender  was a resident in an  EU 
country and as far as they were drafted in a rather formalistic way the rules could not be 
applied.  After a strange approach  of the  Spanish  Tax  Administration, the Audiencia 
Nacional in its July  4th  2013  decision (Colomer Group case)  decided that the  GAAR 
could  have  been applied in  order to corect the avoidance  of the thin-cap rules64.  The 
decision lacks technical explanations  but in any case it seems reasonable to apply the 
GAAR in cases of the kind as far as the legal certainty and the bona fide application of 
the  SAARs  might  never justify its  very abuse. In short if the  SAAR is  not applicable 
due to an artificial arangement setled by the taxpayer it could never be argued that the 
legislator considered that arangement as non-artificial a contrario. 
 
A similar solution would be corect in our opinion if the SAAR is not applicable due to 
EU-Law requirements.  Taking again the example  of the  Spanish  Thin-Cap rules, the 
fact that the legislator, starting 2004, declared the fix ratio approach non applicable in 
an EU context, does not mean that any capitalization structure must be admited for tax 
purposes  when the lender is a  European resident.  The  only explicit (and implicit) 
statement  of the legislator in this case is that fixed-ratios run contrary to the 
fundamental freedoms but of course this does not exclude an arm´s length analysis of 
the debt-equity ratio in a European context, based on the Spanish GAAR65. This does 
not mean of course, as pretended sometimes in the Spanish administrative practice, that 
fixed ratios  might  be reintroduced through the  back  door  by  using the  3:1 ratio 
implicitly in the analysis of the Spanish GAAR. 
 
5. GAARs and Tax Treaties. 
 
Despite the  2003 revision to the  Commentary  on  Art.  1  of the  OECD  Model  Tax 
Convention (OECD  Commentary,  hereinafter), it is stil  doubtful  whether  or  not the 
application of a domestic GAAR in a DTC context could be in breach of the pacta sunt 
servanda principle66. Probably for this reason, certain states -and among them Spain67- 
have decided to expressly alow, in a tax treaty context, the application of domestic anti-
avoidance rules, with diferent nuances in its wording68. 
 
Even if some scholars have criticized this kind of provision, it obviously alows going 
beyond the possible sense(s) of the treaty wording and, therefore, prevents an eventual 
breach  of the pacta sunt servanda principle.  On the contrary, the situation turns 
problematic in those cases in which tax treaties are silent on the application of GAARs 
64 Even if finaly, due to procedural reasons, it was not applied in the case. 
65 A possible application of transfer pricing rules is a more complicated issue that wil not be dealt with in 
this contribution. 
66 In this sense Zornoza & Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (2010), 
p. 151. 
67 Tax treaties  with  Armenia,  Barbados,  Bosnia and  Herzegovina,  Costa  Rica,  Georgia, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan,  Kuwait,  Moldova,  Pakistan,  Serbia,  Singapore,  Trinidad and  Tobago and  Uruguay, al  of 
them signed after 2004. 
68 For  different  models  of this  provision see:  De  Broe, International  Tax  Planning  and  Prevention  of 
Abuse, p. 462 et seq. 
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in a treaty context. Even if a vast majority of scholars show a diferent position 69, the 
administrative practice and the Courts, at least in Spain, do not consider the relationship 
between GAARs and DTCs as problematic. 
 
The question has been posed for the first time, at least explicitly, in the so-caled debt 
push down saga, a kind of transaction that the Spanish Tax Administration has faced by 
means of the GAAR 1963 without being the Spanish DTC network a serious obstacle. 
The fact that in those cases the lenders were companies resident in DTC countries has 
not posed a problem. The Tax Administration and the Courts70 have simply ignored the 
troublesome coexistence  of  domestic  GAARs and treaties  by  merely stating that  non-
resident taxpayers are not afected –and therefore the DTC is not applicable- as far as 
the  only concerned company is that  paying the interest  not admited in  deduction. In 
short as far as the application  of the  GAAR  displays efects just in relation to the 
taxation of a Spanish resident the application of a DTC is not afected. So, being as this 
is true, it is  by  no  means less true that the  non-deductibility  of  paid interests and its 
taxation in the country of residence of the lender according to the DTC subjects those 
interests to a higher efective taxation than the one established in the treaty generating 
an evident economic  double taxation71.  Moreover this approach  wil  probably entail a 
violation of article 24.4 of the OECD Model according to which “interest, royalties and 
other  disbursements  paid  by  an enterprise  of  a  Contracting  State to  a resident  of the 
other Contracting State shal, for the purpose of determining the taxable profits of such 
enterprise,  be  deductible  under the same conditions  as if they  had  been  paid to  a 
resident of the first-mentioned State". In relation to this, the Tax Administration and the 
Courts have aleged that the reason to deny the deduction of the interests is not that they 
have been paid to non-resident companies of the group but the fact that these interests 
lack a  genuine and  wel-founded commercial reason; therefore -the reasoning is 
folowed- those interests would have been treated identicaly if paid to a resident parent 
company.  This approach shows the already  mentioned inclination  of the  Spanish tax 
authorities to introduce the valid commercial reason approach  when  dealing  with the 
application  of the  GAAR;  but even accepting that  deviated approach, the reasoning 
seems less than persuasive: when it comes to the discrimination the key point is where 
the lender (not the parent company) is a resident. And, additionaly, had the group been 
entirely resident, the  GAAR  would  have  never  been applied  due to the eliminations 
imposed by the domestic tax-consolidation regime. 
 
In any case, this is just a sample of the trivial approach of Spanish Tax authorities and 
Courts to the issue  of  GAARs in a  DTC context.  This  might  be explained  by the 
“reverential respect” showed to the OECD Commentary that is frequently used by the 
Tax  Administration and also atributed  by the  Courts a legal  value, in the absence  of 
reservations, equivalent to the  very  DTC  provision and, in any case, considered a 
69 Martín Jiménez, The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of Tax Treaties: 
A  Case for the  Declining  Effect  of the  OECD  Commentaries?,  Buletin  of International  Fiscal 
Documentation  58,  no.  1 (2004)  p.  17 et seq.;  García  Prats,  The “Abuse  of  Tax  Law”:  Prospects and 
Analysis, in Essays in International and European Tax Law (Bizioli ed.), (2010), p. 49 (p. 86); Zornoza 
& Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (2010), p. 150 et. seq. 
70 Similar arguments in the  Decisions  of the Audiencia  Nacional of  February  7th and  December  13th 
2014 and January 14th 2014. 
71 Implicitly admited  by the  Decisions  of the Audiencia Nacional of  February  7th and  December  13th 
2013 and January 14 th 2014, stating nevertheless: “This double taxation would be alien to this procedure 
as not generated by the contended assesment and in any case should be examined in a diferent appeal”.  
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necessary  and  authentic interpretation element  of  a  DTC72.  For that reason it is 
extraordinarily surprising that  no single  decision can  be found  quoting the  position  of 
the OECD Commentary on Art.1 of the Model on this issue; interpreting a silence might 
always  be  dangerous  but it seems as if the  Spanish  Courts took the legal  value  of the 
Commentary as a given. 
 
In relation to the alocation of an item of income to a diferent taxpayer as a result of the 
application of the GAAR, the Spanish experience is rather limited. A possible ground 
for this is the tendency  of the  Courts to treat artificial  management  of the rules  on 
atribution  of income to tax  payers, resorting to the sham transaction  doctrine and the 
subsequent disregard of treaty issues in these cases. The leading case to this respect, at 
least in the international tax arena, is the  Decision  of the  Spanish  Supreme  Court  of 
September 25th 2009 (Stroh Brewery Company-Cruzcampo case)73. Applying the sham 
transaction  doctrine, as it  would  probably  happen if the  GAAR  were applied, the 
Spanish  Tax  Authorities adjust taxation for  Spanish  purposes,  geting totaly  out  of 
consequences, in terms of double taxation, it might generate for other taxpayers. 
 
6. GAARS and European Union law requirements (the Freedoms, directives). 
 
Despite the interest showed by Spanish scholars in the antiabuse case law of the ECJ 74, 
the application  of the  GAAR to  EU cross-border transactions  has  not  generated 
significant problems. This does not mean that the Spanish practice might be considered 
satisfactory, but rather that the analysis of the GAAR under a EU Law perspective has 
been simply set aside.  A clear example  might  be found again in the debt push down 
saga in several  decisions  of the Audiencia Nacional that tiptoes through the  European 
side  of the controversy  by  merely stating that  no  discrimination issue  might arise in 
relation to the fundamental freedoms as far as the  GAAR  would  have  been applied 
exactly in the same way had the case been purely domestic.  
 
By means of this simple argument the Courts left apart the more dificult question on 
weather the transactions could be considered wholy artificial, folowing the expression 
contained in the  ECJ  Cadbury  Schweppes  Decision. It seems evident that debt  push 
down transactions pursue a tax objective inasmuch as they are performed in Spain for 
the purpose of benefiting from more favorable tax legislation; but according to the ECJ 
72 Using the expression in quotes the Decisions of the Supreme Court of July 29th 2000, July 15th 2002, 
December 15th 2005, July 4th 2006 and February 6th 2008 Pueden citarse como representativas de esa 
jurisprudencia las SSTS de 29 de julio de 2000 y 15 de julio de 2002, de la que se toma el entrecomilado, 
o las posteriores de 15 de diciembre de 2005, 4 de julio de 2006 y 6 de febrero de 2008. See Serrano, F. 
La interpretación  de los  Convenios  de  doble imposición internacional en la jurisprudencia  del  Tribunal 
Supremo: la función  de los  Comentarios  del  Modelo  de  Convenio  de la  OCDE  para evitar la  doble 
imposición internacional en materia de renta y patrimonio, Estudios Financieros, Revista de contabilidad 
y tributación 341-342 (2011), p. 127 et seq. 
73 A company resident in the USA owns al the shares of a Spanish Company. Instead of seling the shares 
directly to the  buyer (Guiness) they are contributed to the capital  of two  US subsidiaries that sel the 
shares to Guiness avoiding thereby taxation at source. 
74 See Ruiz Almendral, Tax Avoidance and the European Court of Justice: What is at Stake for European 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules?, Intertax vol. 33, (2005), p. 560 et seq.; Zornoza Pérez Las normas anti-
abuso frente a la competencia fiscal en en marco comunitario, in Labeaga Azcona, Chico de la Camara 
and Ruiz Garijo (ed.) Repercusiones tributarias de la ampliación de la Unión Europea, Madrid (2010), p. 
351 et seq. 
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doctrine this does not in itself sufice to constitute abuse75. Especialy if one takes into 
account that even accepting its labeling as aggressive tax planning schemes76, in some 
cases  one can  doubt if those structures are in itself "wholy  artificial  arrangements 
which do not reflect economic reality”. It is true that the described transactions do not 
modify the property of the shares by the group. But it is no less true that the atribution 
of the shares to a Spanish subsidiary might have economic substance and this cannot be 
simply rejected treating  MNEs as a single taxpayer.  Therefore if the appeals finaly 
reach the Spanish Supreme Court one might expect a preliminary ruling that might wel 
be crucial for the solution of the problem. 
 
In a nutshel a dissociation appears between a GAAR that seems at first glance totaly in 
line  with the case law  of the  ECJ  on  domestic antiavoidance  measures77 and an 
administrative and judicial  practice that interprets the  GAAR in a rather rigorist  way 
that  might  wel contravene that case law78.  And even if the  drafting  of the  Spanish 
GAAR has not been inspired in the case Law of the ECJ this does not mean it must not 
be interpreted according to that case law in  order to  properly comply  with the 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
The situation  does  not seem to  be  beter  when it comes to the interpretation  of  other 
anti-avoidance rule, especialy the valid commercial reason rule contained in the merger 
tax regime. There are certainly causes for concern: i) Starting with the Decision of the 
Audiencia  Nacional of  May  7th  2007 the  Spanish  Courts started an autonomous 
interpretation  of the  valid commercial reason clause  dissociated from the concept  of 
artificiality and focused  on the subjective intentions  of the tax  payers (not  on the 
objective efects  of the transactions)79. i)  The  valid commercial reason clause is 
analyzed as if the very restructuring business (e.g. merger) could be isolated from the 
remaining circumstances of the whole set of transactions. This approach might be seen 
in the  Decisions  of the  Audiencia  Nacional  of January  24th and  March  9th  2011  on 
Management and Leveraged Buy Out transactions.  The  Court recognizes the financial 
function  of the transaction  – it could  hardly  have  been  diferent as far as these 
transactions are explicitly regulated in commercial law- but denies the existence of valid 
commercial reasons as far as “there is  neither sign  of  benefits reported  by the 
transactions to the general running of the company” “nor of a financial optimization”. 
The evident contradictions in these statements render further criticism unnecessary. ii) 
Finaly, the valid commercial reason approach is becoming an increasing importance in 
the Spanish anti-avoidance culture. The phenomenon has been already described; now 
we should just mention it has acquired such an importance that the Audiencia Nacional 
(in its Decision of February 16th 2011), normaly so indulgent with the tax authorities, 
has stated “…there is a worrying tendency of the Spanish Tax Administration to use EU-
Law rooted anti-avoidance techniques to face artificial arrangements”. 
 
75 See Centros (C-212/97) para. 27, Inspire Art (C-167/0) para. 96, and Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04) 
para. 37. 
76 As such is described in OECD (2013) Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Paris p. 79 et. seq. 
77 As is unanimously recognized; see for example the Commentaries of the Comission to adapt Spanish 
Tax  Law to  EU  Law requirements: La adaptación de la regulación del Derecho Tributario general al 
Ordenamiento Comunitario, IEF Madrid (2010), pp. 64-65 y 91. 
78 The  Comission  had already reported  on this risk: La  adaptación  de la regulación  del  Derecho 
Tributario general al Ordenamiento Comunitario, IEF Madrid (2010), p. 65. 
79 An autonomous interpretation which, by the way, is difficult to bring together with the decision of the 
ECJ in Kofoed (C-321/2005). 
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7.  GAARS  and recent  European  developments (CCCTB, recommendation  of the 
Commission). 
 
The  proposal for a  CCCTB  Directive80 (hereinafter, the  CCCTB  Directive) is the first 
normative text in the EU that includes a supranational definition of abuse and a GAAR, 
supplemented by two ad hoc anti-abuse clauses, or SAARs. Unlike al other Directives, 
the  goal  here  does  not to  merely alow  EU  Member  States to apply their anti-abuse 
clauses, or to counter abuse solely within the specific boundaries of ad hoc provisions, 
but rather to  provide a comprehensive framework  within  which the  benefits  of 
secondary Union law apply to genuine transactions only. 
 
The first question to be dealt with is of course the very necessity of this provision that 
being reasonable perhaps just related to transactions with Third States is drafted in fact 
with a far-reaching scope. In second place even if based-upon the anti-avoidance case 
law  of the  ECJ, the  proposed  GAAR  has  been  drafted in a rather restrictive  manner 
being  only applicable to transactions  performed "for the sole  purpose  of  avoiding 
taxation"81.  Third, it is expressly admited that the  GAAR should  not  be applied to 
genuine commercial activities. This introduces in the GAAR an economic/commercial 
substance test that implicitly admits tax  planning to the extent that the arangements 
incorporate elements of a genuine conduct of trade, regardless of whether, or not, they 
are in essence designed to mitigate tax. Finaly the relationship between the GAAR and 
other SAARs applicable just to Third Countries (disalowance of interest deduction and 
CFC rules) are not clear. 
 
In short the  CCCTB  GAAR  proposal remains an  unsatisfactory rule especialy as it 
concerns legal certainty.  This  might  be the reason for the insistence  by the  EU 
Commission Recommendation of December the 6th 2012 on Aggressive Tax Planning82 
on a  very  detailed  description  of  what  might  be considered an artificial transaction83. 
Of course the topical approach to artificiality contained in the  Recommendation84 
provides certainty to the clause but, at the same time, might generate several problems 
in  diferent  Member  States as the  definition  of artificiality is just a list  of  definitions 
deliberately elaborated to cover al European traditions and approaches.  
 
But even if these  European  GAARs  were consistent and conceptualy similar in 
diferent  Member  States its  practical application should  be subject to a close 
surveilance  by the  ECJ in  order to avoid  national  deviations  originated  by  divergent 
legal traditions. And if this is true in a mere European area let alone when it comes to a 
pretended  universal  harmonization. It is true that the recent codification  of anti-
avoidance doctrines in the USA or the UK might have supported a globalization of the 
anti-avoidance reactions,  nevertheless the  national traditions and  peculiarities are so 
strong that it is stil soon to talk about a  harmonized  global  GAAR; to this respect it 
80 Proposal for a  Council  Directive  on a  Common  Consolidated  Corporate  Tax  Base (CCCTB), 
SEC(2011) 315 final; SEC(2011) 316 final. 
81 Therefore the proposal of the Parliament to extend its scope to transactions "carried out mainly for the 
purpose  of  avoiding taxation" seems to  make sense (European  Parliament legislative resolution  of  19 
April  2012  on the  proposal for a  Council  directive  on a  Common  Consolidated  Corporate  Tax  Base 
(CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)), 2013/C 258 E/25)  
82 C(2012) 8806 final. 
83 See point 4.4 of the Recommendation. 
84 Instead of giving one conceptual approach to artificiality, six different definitions are contained in the 
Recommendation. 
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might  be enough  mentioning the strong reaction  generated against the  main  purpose 
clause drafted in the Public Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the grating 
of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 
 
8. Alternatives to GAARs. 
 
The  history  of the  Spanish  GAAR is actualy the  history  of its avoidance  by the  Tax 
Administration.  The  Tax  Administration  has systematicaly resorted to alternatives to 
GAARs in  order to fight tax avoidance.  The reasons for this alternative approach are 
wel known and have been already mentioned in this contribution. At this moment we 
wil just  make a reference to the  use  of  purposive interpretation and substance-over 
form approaches in the Spanish practice and judge it in comparison to the GAAR. 
 
In  our  opinion,  GAARs cannot  be replaced  by a  general recognition  of  purposive 
interpretation even if  we are conscious  of an extended  position according to  which 
GAARs  would  be  nothing  diferent from the  mere statement  of the  necessity  of an 
interpretation according to the purpose of the avoided or caught provision85. The whole 
confusion  on this issue is  generated  by the traditional interpretative criteria that  have 
been accepted worldwide. The core of the problem is the distinction between literal and 
teleological interpretation in relation to the same  provision and leading to  diferent 
results. The solution for this conceptual question might be found in the law theory86. 
 
The wording of a legal provision might be polysemous in those cases in which it can be 
atributed diferent meanings. Interpreting a provision implies the selection of one of its 
possible  meanings according to several criteria among  which the  purpose  of the 
interpreted rule  might  be considered crucial. In this context, it is far from clear  what 
“writen law”, “wording” or “literal interpretation” means. The text of a provision is just 
the starting point for its interpretation and, at the same time, the limit for this process as 
the interpreter cannot  go  beyond the  possible  meaning(s)  given to those  words 
(Wortsinn in  German legal theory87).  Thus, every interpretation  must  be literal as it 
departs,  when  determining the  possible sense  of the  words, from  writen law.  At the 
same time every interpretation  must  be teleological if  we take into account that the 
selection  of the  proper  meaning  must  be  guided and rational, and that rules  must  be 
considered to be instruments to achieve certain goals. If al this is true, it seems evident 
that considering  GAARs as  means to  go  beyond the leter  of a tax statute implies a 
logical contradiction. 
 
In this context, the limits of interpretation must be defined according to the possibility 
of atributing diferent meanings to a single legal term. This may not be an easy task in 
those cases in  which  private law concepts are  used in tax statutes, either  by a simple 
reference  or an explicit remission.  Even if legal theory states that the same term 
contained in  diferent rules  might  be  understood  diferently  by folowing their 
85 The folowing reflections are just a  brief summary  of the  position  defended  by these authors in a 
previous article: Zornoza & Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics (2010), 
p. 138-152. 
86 In this contribution  we  depart from the classical  view  of  Larenz (Larenz, Methodenlehre  der 
Rechtswissenschaft (1969), p. 342) which has been assumed by German scholars and case law. See: Báez, 
Los negocios fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 31. 
87 As opposed to the words of a provision designated as Wortlaut. 
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respective legal  purposes88, the  practice in several countries shows a  broad range  of 
approaches in relation to this  problem89.  By contrast, as  has  been stated, even in 
jurisdictions  with a strict adherence to  private law concepts in tax law, there  may  be 
concepts in tax statutes that  do  not corespond to  private law concepts  or  where the 
legislator has made it clear that the concept should have a diferent content from private 
law relations90. In these cases the private law meaning is not binding and the possibility 
of determining several possible meanings from a strict tax law perspective, is certainly 
easier. 
 
In short, when tax statutes make use of private law concepts it seems dificult to fight 
tax avoidance by means of a simple interpretation of the provision avoided. Then it is 
necessary to  go  beyond the  possible senses  of the legal  wording resorting to  GAARs. 
AS stated by Professor HENSEL 90 years ago real avoidance starts exactly there where 
the art of interpretation starts to fail91.  The  problem  might  be  diferent  when tax laws 
contain autonomous concepts that are formulated regardless of Private Law concepts92. 
 
In  our  opinion substance  over form is  neither an alternative to  GAARs.  Even if 
sometimes considered as a  GAAR in itself, the  diferences  must  be  underlined. 
Substance over form is just the description of a legal consequence according to which 
two substantialy equal arangements, regardless  of its legal form,  must  be treated 
equaly for tax purposes. In this approach the technique does not essentialy difer from 
analogy or the general constitutional principle of equality. It does not difer either from 
the legal consequences of the GAAR as previously described. The diference, and this is 
the crucial issue, lies in the fact that substance  over form lacks legal conditions  of 
application; formulated as a question: what must happen in order to disregard the legal 
form and tax the arangement according to its substance?  Substance  over form  works 
more as a  principle than as a rule.  Therefore, and  unless  we identify implicit legal 
conditions similar to those  previously  described in relation to  GAARs, the  principle 
generates an  unacceptable level  of  uncertainty that seems  dificult to reconcile  with 
Domestic, European93 and even with International legal standards94. 
 
In a  nutshel  GAARs imply  uncertainty per se inasmuch as they are  built  on  vague 
concepts such as artificiality.  Nevertheless the  uncertainty, and therefore its  possible 
88 This is in fact an old idea frequently named as “legal concept’s relativity”. See: Engisch, Die Einheit 
der Rechtsordnung. Unveränd. reprograf. Nachdr. d. 1935 (1987) p. 45. 
89 In relation to this see: Zimmer, General Report, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 25 et seq. 
90 Zimmer, General Report, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 27. 
91 Hensel,  A. “Zur  Dogmatik  des  Begriffs “Steuerumgehung”, in Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zitelmann 
zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, (1923), p. 244. 
92 In relation to atribution of income for tax treaty purposes: Zornoza & Báez, in Tax Treaties: Building 
Bridges between Law and Economics (2010), p. 143-150. 
93 Especialy if  we take into account the insistence  of the  ECJ  on legal certainty as a requisite  of anti-
avoidance rules in order to be consistent with the Fundamental Freedoms: ECJ 3 October 2013, C-282/12, 
Itelcar – Automóveis de Aluguer Lda. Para. 44; ECJ 5 July 2012, C-318/10, SIAT, Paras. 58-59.  
94 Case Law on Human Rights and Taxation is certainly in an embrionic state. Nevertheless it should not 
be  discarded that in a  near future tax  provisions  might  be judged effectively confronting its (unclear) 
design  with article  1  of the  First  Protocol  of the  ECHR.  Some  Scholars and  practitioners  have already 
made some  useful reflections  on anti-avoidance  measures:  Zalasiński,  A. “Case  Law-Based  Anti-
Avoidance Measures and Principles of Human Rights Protection” in G. Kofler et al., Human Rights and 
Taxation in Europe and the World (G. Kofler, M. Poiares Maduro & P. Pistone eds., IBFD 2011), Online 
Books IBFD (accessed 25 April 2014).  
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degeneration into a pure arbitrary instrument, makes substance over form an unsuitable 
device to face tax avoidance. 
 
